Abstract This paper defends a constructive interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason, which is built in analogy with an experimental construction that Kant believes to characteristic of chemistry. I also argue for a way to reconcile the methodological perspective of the constructivist method with that of transcendental reflection. I therefore provide a constructive explanation for what Kant describes as being pure reason and the argument of the transcendental deduction. I propose to frame the different perspectives in such a way that the experimental construction is the ratio cognoscendi of pure reason, while pure reason is the ratio essendi of the experimental construction. O’Neill (1989, 2015) is one of the most important scholars that have argued for a constructivist reading of the Critique of pure reason (CPR). In this paper I develop and explore new aspects of this line of interpretation. One of the main criticisms raised against constructivist readings of Kant’s philosophy is an alleged commitment to subjectivism or voluntarism (cf. Kleingeld & Willaschek 2019). This concern led some scholars to rename their position as constitutivist instead (Korsgaard 2009; Sensen 2013, 2017; Formosa 2011). Constitutivism, is intended to be a sort of constructivism capable of avoiding voluntarism. However, it becomes difficult, sometimes, to differentiate between the constitutivist and foundationalist positions, which are based on transcendental reflection and imply a sort of realist perspective on reason. The same preoccupation applies to the constructivist interpretation of the CPR. In order to deal with this issue, the following questions must be addressed: how can constructivism justify the necessity and universality of transcendental principles of pure reason without compromising the normative and procedural aspects of the construction? How to reconcile arguments based on the analysis of representations and faculties with a constructivist procedure? Or even, how may transcendental reflection, as a view of the possibility of a priori cognition, be rendered compatible with a constructive procedure? This paper is divided into three sections, followed by brief final remarks. The first section outlines the main characteristics of constructivism and relates them to Kant’s positions about the nature of philosophy and its method. The second part argues for a type of experimental constructivism that might serve as a guiding analogy to understand the method underlying the CPR. Thirdly, I will show how the transcendental subject and pure reason are derived from this experimental construction. The conclusion briefly points out some advantages of this position.

Resumo Este artigo defende a existência de uma relação teórica muito próxima entre Kant e Kelsen no âmbito da filosofia do direito internacional. Argumenta-se que há uma herança teórica especialmente com relação aos conceitos de soberania, monismo, e a exigência de um direito internacional como elemento necessário para assegurar a paz. A metodologia utilizada é hermenêutica e analítico-conceitual. Argumentase Argumenta se soberania monismo paz analíticoconceitual. analíticoconceitual analítico conceitual. conceitual analítico-conceitual

Abstract This article defends a narrow theoretical relation between Kant and Kelsen in the field of philosophy of international law. We argue for a theoretical heritage concerning the concepts of sovereignty, monism, and the requirement of an international law as a necessary element for achieving peace. The methodology used is hermeneutical and analytic-conceptual. sovereignty monism peace analyticconceptual. analyticconceptual analytic conceptual. conceptual analytic-conceptual

RESUMO Nesse artigo eu argumento que a ideia de uma história universal é sistematicamente legitimada no sistema da filosofia transcendental de Kant por meio do conceito de precisão [Bedürfnis] da razão pura prática. Nesse sentido, a ideia de uma história universal é uma parte fundamental da imagem moral do mundo que emerge da totalidade da filosofia de Kant e é crucial para o entendimento tanto da possibilidade de um sistema da razão pura, quanto para um desenvolvimento completo da filosofia moral, particularmente para a filosofia política.

ABSTRACT In this paper, I argue that the idea of a universal history is systematically legitimized in Kant’s transcendental system of philosophy by way of the concept of a need [Bedürfnis] for pure practical reason. In this sense, the idea of a universal history is a fundamental part of the moral image of the world that emerges from Kant’s whole philosophy, and it is crucial for understanding both the possibility of the system of pure reason, as well the full development of Kant’s moral philosophy, especially for political philosophy.

Resumo Este artigo analisa a influência da filosofia de Rousseau na teoria antropológica de Kant. No primeiro momento, apresentam-se as semelhanças e diferenças acerca do modo como cada autor compreende o estado de natureza. No segundo momento, estabelece-se uma comparação entre o conceito de sociabilidade insociável de Kant e os conceitos de piedade e amor próprio, na filosofia de Rousseau.

Abstract This paper analyses the influence of Rousseau’s philosophy on Kant’s anthropological theory. Firstly, the similarities and differences between each philosopher’s understanding of the state of nature is presented. Secondly, a comparison between Kant’s concept of unsocial sociability and Rousseau’s concepts of piety and self-love is presented.

Este artigo apresenta uma avaliação crítica da teoria libertariana de Nozick a partir da perspectiva da filosofia moral kantiana. As críticas são divididas em três seções. A primeira questiona a justificação libertariana da aquisição e do direito à propriedade. A segunda avalia as dificuldades e implicações do princípio de transferência. A terceira analisa a questão de como o princípio de retificação funciona no contexto da teoria libertariana de Nozick. Como conclusão mostra-se que, apesar de Nozick reivindicar uma filiação à filosofia moral kantiana, existe um abismo entre ambas as perspectivas teóricas, de modo que para a filosofia kantiana o libertarianismo não passaria de uma teoria do egoísmo moral.

This article presents a critical assessment of Nozick's libertarian theory from the perspective of Kantian moral philosophy. The criticisms are divided into three sections. The first challenges the libertarian justification for the original acquisition of holdings and the right to property. The second evaluates the presuppositions and difficulties with the principle of transfer of holdings. The third section examines how the principle of rectification works in the context of Nozick's libertarian theory. At the end it is concluded that despite Nozick's claim of an affiliation with Kantian moral philosophy, there is a deep gap between both moral perspectives, so that libertarianism would be for Kantian philosophy only a theory of moral selfishness.

Este trabalho analisa o conceito de esperança nas obras de Condorcet e Kant. Defende-se que o conceito de esperança no progresso da humanidade é de fundamental importância para a compreensão da filosofia política de ambos os autores. Por um lado, esperança oferece um horizonte de sentido que protege suas propostas políticas de visões de mundo antagônicas; por outro, ela se incorpora no próprio projeto político tendo ao mesmo tempo a função de motivação e de criação de instituições políticas com caráter pedagógico.

This paper analyses the concept of hope in the works of Condorcet and Kant. It will be advocated that the concept of hope in the progress of humanity is of great importance for the comprehension of the political philosophy of both authors. On the one hand, hope gives a horizon of meaning to political philosophy that protects it against antagonistic world views. On the other hand, hope is incorporated into the political philosophy itself having, at once, a motivational function and creation of political institutions with a pedagogical character, as well.